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The Industrial Revolution encompassed great change in the lifestyles of individuals. As the 
hierarchal layout of society started to lose its influence, the opportunities for lower classes to 
change their lives and positions in their communities grew. Starting in Western Europe, society 
became more open to this change in persuasive rhetoric and welcomed new inventions and 
innovations to technologies. The resulting economic boom was due to inventors using marketing 
tactics, such as better knowledge of consumers’ preferences. Competition, motivated by pursuit 
of profits, among rival producers, resulted in more products and services that bettered the lives of 
everyone. This paper portrays the world before, during, and after the Industrial Revolution to 
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Process Analysis Statement 
Starting in December of 2019, I began reading recommended texts from my advisor, Dr. 
Steve Horwitz, for my thesis, with the impression that I knew what my thesis was going to be. 
My thesis would be a paper over the Industrial Revolution in the 1700s, and why it happened 
when and where it did. I soon learned that I knew very little about this topic from an economic 
standpoint and was even less sure about my project. Although I have always been interested in 
history, my knowledge of the time period was certainly lacking. Through my reading of many 
texts written by economic historians, I began to gain a grip on the time period as well as form 
connections from history and economics to my own major, marketing. That was the most 
exciting part for me – looking at the past and seeing the roots of modern marketing techniques, 
used before marketing was even a discipline. 
For the first half of spring semester, I spent my time reading, and taking notes, and 
emailing questions to my advisor, rinse and repeat. In the middle of the semester, however, 
Professor Horwitz’s health required him to step back from helping me. I am very grateful for the 
start that he gave me. Through correspondence with different professors, Professor Snow 
volunteered to take over advising my paper, and with his help, I was able to get started writing. 
My paper changed from merely being an analysis of the time period before the Industrial 
Revolution into a project tying together primary and secondary sources to demonstrate the 
change in the beliefs of individuals and the effects of marketing adaptations. I also dived more 
into marketing journals to learn about the beginnings of marketing. My main regret with this 
thesis is that was hard to find research pertaining to marketing during the time period, as many 
writers addressed the influences of marketing rather lightly.  
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I am really proud of this paper, and of the efforts that I put into it, even if the project 
altered with the more I read and learned. It was so much different and larger than anything that I 




Bob Dylan (1964) sang that “the times are a’changin,’” but the world never experienced a 
change as dramatic as the Industrial Revolution. Governments, societies, and the roles of 
individuals were radically altered over a period of a hundred years. This period in time is often 
viewed in a negative light due to the poor working conditions of laborers, the expansion of 
pollution, and child labor. Encyclopædia Britannica editor, John Rafferty, states that the 
development of factories drove many workers to cities, forcing them to live in overcrowded, 
poorly ventilated shantytowns, where outbreaks of infectious diseases were easily spread. 
Natural resources were also depleted “to fuel factories and sustain the output of each and every 
type of manufactured good” (Rafferty, 2020). The Industrial Revolution did mark a drastic 
change in the way people had lived since the dawn of civilization, but it increased the 
opportunities that individuals had to better their lives. Society became accustomed to the idea of 
self-betterment, and the economy developed to welcome innovations. During the Industrial 
Revolution, Western ideology turned more individualist, supporting the property rights of 
individuals while allowing them the dignity of inventing and innovating with the incentives of 
profit and fame. An individual that knew her target market and catered to her audience’s needs 
impacted the economy with her invention. Innovations of the market allowed for the diffusion of 
ideas as well as economic gains.  
Many theories have been proposed to account for this change. Nobel laurate and 
economic historian, Douglass C. North (1981) illustrated the social and economic shift in his 
book Structure and Change in Economic History. If an ancient Grecian were “miraculously 
transported through time to the England of 1750, he or she would have found much that was 
familiar.” In contrast, “the Greek alighting two centuries later [in 1950], would discover what 
would appear to be an unreal world in which little would be recognizable or even 
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understandable, so much had the state of mankind been altered in that relatively brief historical 
time span” (p. 158). North argues that the political institutions that were in place allowed for this 
change, where before, the existing institutions had proved an obstacle for economic growth. 
Before the Industrial Revolution, humans formed states in order to enforce property 
rights, socially accepted constructs of how resources are used and owned. The states that were 
established, and have morphed in purpose and function over time, are “organization[s] with a 
comparative advantage in violence, extending over... geographic area[s] whose boundaries are 
determined by its power to tax constituents” (North, 1981, p. 21). In addition to enforcing 
property rights and taxation, states also enforced contracts, standardized measurements, and 
lowered transactions costs as a result of state actions.  
North begins at man’s primitive state as hunters and gatherers. The small bands of 
people, due to their limited population size, did not need governments, but “exploited [their] 
opportunities in agriculture by constraining members with rules, taboos, and prohibitions, almost 
as effectively as if private property rights had been established” (p. 81). In small groups, 
individuals could check and balance each other to ensure that resources were being used fairly 
and efficiently. In small enough groups, each member would be necessary for the survival of the 
community, as roles needed to be filled. This gave importance to the individual and could allow 
for more equal voice when dealing with the division of resources and the making of decisions 
that would impact the group as a whole.  
As these groups learned to farm, there was a shift in property rights. Before, each group 
shared resources communally. The sedentary act of farming was an investment by the 
community, that needed to be protected from outsiders, who could steal resources. The resources 
that agriculture brought forth necessitated that access was open to members of the community 
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who had invested the resources in the first place. This concept of exclusive property rights is 
important, as the rising population—that was sustained through the advancing agriculture—
meant that new forms of enforcing these rights had to be put in place—and this brought about the 
introduction of the state. The state took on many forms, “despotic” and “democratic” for 
example, and often varied in size and scope (p. 86, 92). 
Economist Mancur Olson (1993) developed the theory of the “stationary bandit” to 
explain the transition from communal societies that used informal norms to make group 
decisions to states where decisions were made by individuals or people of a particular class for 
the group as a whole. Olson theorized that the bandits, who lived off of the crops and resources 
of communal farmers instead of producing for themselves, became stationary by staying with 
one community instead of roving to steal from new groups of farmers. The bandits could 
“monopolize and rationalize their theft in the form of taxes” by offering protection to the 
community from other bandits. Maintaining this station required the bandits to “provide a 
peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity” (Olson, p. 567). The bandit 
could depend on the cooperation of the community as long as he placated the people and did not 
infringe too far upon their resources, as to not cause a revolt. Bandits and the states they created 
maintained this balance through legitimization, which shall be expanded on later in this paper. 
By protecting the property rights of the farmers from other bandits, the stationary bandit could 
continue extracting rents without the hassle of being threatened by farmers anymore.  
The economic definition of rents, which applies to this scenario, is described by Michael 
Munger as “any return on investment, or effort, that exceeds the rate of return” (Munger, 2006). 
The arrangement by the stationary bandits is known as rent seeking, that economist Robert 
Tollison argues is “the expenditure of scare [limited] resources to capture an artificially created 
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transfer” (Munger, 2006). Rents are different from profits, as rents have a limit to what can be 
extracted. The farmers only had a certain amount of resources that the bandit could take as a 
wealth transfer. Profits, on the other hand, occur when new wealth is created through the 
development of opportunities. 
The enforcement of property rights by states not only protected resources, but could also 
serve to encourage further investments, by “reward[ing] the owners… [and providing] a direct 
incentive to improve efficiency and productivity, or in more fundamental terms, to acquire more 
knowledge and new techniques” (North, 1981, p. 89). Under exclusive property rights, farmers in 
the community would be encouraged to invest more time into their crops, knowing that the 
harvest would better benefit them if they increased their efforts.  
This incentive could be negated, however, if property rights were infringed too much by 
the state. For farmers living under communal property rights, where the elites who did not 
participate in the labor of farming received a large share of the agricultural gains, there was less 
incentive for farmers to put extra time and resources into improving their crops because the 
farmers did not reap the full rewards. The elites coerced the transfer of resources leveraging their 
comparative advantage in violence, marking a diversion from the voluntary exchange of goods 
and services between individuals.  
States also brought about organizational decision-making – which North states “is an 
absolute prerequisite for a viable agricultural community” (1981, p. 93). While this included the 
routine decisions of who would plant what, and when, as populations in communities grew into 
cities, the roles of the institutions changed as well. States used coercive power to enforce 
community rules and to compete with other states. Under large governments, resources were 
taken from the people in order to further the goals of the institutional state. States can act to 
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encourage investments, innovations, and the use of new technology, but the extraction of taxes 
can also squelch these incentives, just as the threat of outsiders could in primitive societies. 
North observes that before the Industrial Revolution, the actions of states often 
suppressed economic innovations, through both the “widespread tendency of states to produce 
inefficient property rights and hence fail to achieve sustained growth; and the inherent instability 
of all states, which leads to economic change and ultimately economic decline” (North, 1981, p. 
23). The “existence of the state is essential for economic growth” (p. 20). However, as the state 
enforces property rights for individuals and prevents anarchy, economic growth is “inherently 
destabilizing to a state” (p.29). For a state to maintain coercive power over its people, the state 
must collect rents through taxes to provide public goods, such as enforcing contracts through law 
and providing a military to protect constituents from outsiders. Constituents allow for their 
property rights to be infringed for the benefits that the state bestows. With this authority, 
however, comes great power to abuse, and the ruling class often acted in its own interest, and not 
in the interests of the people.  
The stations of rulers were threatened by rivals: the upper class in their nation, who had 
the power and connections needed to dethrone the ruler; authoritative religious institutions; and 
competing states. These threats created incentives for rulers to protect themselves, often at the 
expense of their constituents. Political rivals were substitutes to the current ruler, and to keep 
them at bay, the ruler either bribed these rivals with property rights extorted from constituents 
and/or the ruler increased their own protection through the expansion of the military. For 
example, after the Hundred Years’ War in France, the state neutralized the threat of “potential 
political rivals within France (the nobility and the clergy) [by] exlud[ing them] from taxation” 
(North, 1981, p.149). Either way, North states that “taxes and confiscations alter the structure of 
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property rights so that there is a reduced incentive [for the constituents] to undertake productive 
activity” (p.115). 
Another threat to rulers came in the form of the people they ruled over, and in order to 
quell uprisings, states needed to maintain legitimacy, which they achieved through strategic 
marketing. The mechanism for maintaining legitimacy depended on the society. For ancient 
Egypt, “religion played a crucial role in legitimizing the coercive power of the ruler… the 
Egyptian Pharaoh was both the ruler and a god” (North, 1981, p. 95). Decisions made by the 
Pharaoh carried more weight with the constituents, as the Egyptian people believed the rulings to 
be of divine nature. The Egyptian state was secured by this legitimizing tactic for many 
centuries.  
For the ancient Greeks, the unity of the city-states was legitimized through “a belief in a 
common ancestry, a common language and religion” and marketed through the “use of the same 
oracles, and a common participation in the Greek games” (North, 1981, p. 96). Maintaining 
religious sites and the facilitation of the Olympics were investments in the legitimacy of the state 
and methods of subduing and uniting the Greek people.  
For Western Europeans, the manorial system of “a lord and his knights [as]… both a 
warrior class and a highly specialized ruling class” was upheld by the “ideological gloss” of 
chivalry (North, 1981, p.127). Under chivalry, the duty to the upper class was honored by the 
serfs, slaves, and free laborers, who outputted goods and services in exchange for protection and 
justice offered by the lord and his knights.  
A more modern example North provides is the investments that nations like America, 
China, and the Soviet Union made in their educational structures in the 1950’s to promote 
 9 
capitalist or communist ideologies to the young, so that future generations would believe in and 
uphold the current governmental structures (North, 1981, p.54).  
States invest in their own legitimacy in order to maintain the support of the people. 
States’ marketing often leans more towards coercion than it does persuasion, however, and so the 
marketing that arose by individuals around the time of the Industrial Revolution was radically 
different from what society had witnessed before and was subversive to the existing institutions 
and methods states utilized to maintain legitimacy. 
 A state’s motives often did not align with those of its constituents, so economic growth 
was often slowed to maintain the position of rulers. What differentiated the states of Western 
Europe from other states allowed the Industrial Revolution, a period of sustained economic 
growth, to take place. North claims that “the technological change associated with the Industrial 
Revolution required the prior development of a set of property rights, which raised the private 
rate of return on invention and innovation” (1981, p. 147) (italics included). 
The foundations of this change developed from the century-long population decrease of 
the plague and the increased costs of maintaining a state due to military advancements. With the 
diminished population, labor became scarce, and “the relative bargaining strength shifted from 
the lords to the peasants... as a consequence, the master-servant aspect of serfdom gave way to 
recognition of copyhold rights and an end to servile obligations. . .legally swept away in 1666” 
(North, 1981, p.134-135). The labor hours of men were no longer dictated and controlled by 
lords, and that changed the way that humans had lived for hundreds of years.  
States were further weakened by the heightened costs of maintaining an army, as knights 
were no longer guaranteed as they had been under serfdom and chivalry. North states that “the 
size of a king’s army now depended on his purse,” that caused a rise in the market for 
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mercenaries, and troops had to be paid more to guarantee their willingness to fight (1981, p.137). 
The growing expenses of the state left European rulers in debt that could not be alleviated 
through further taxation of lords, who were already over-taxing a diminished population. Further 
taxing could cause powerful lords to revolt, that would only increase military costs and the risk 
of the ruler losing his or her throne. The costs for states to maintain legitimacy were becoming 
too high. Instead of increasing taxes at the risk of angering the population, many European states 
settled on selling property rights back to the constituents in exchange for revenue. North lists 
many examples of this, including the “taxation of land transfers,” the granting of legal rights to 
merchants, and exemptions from guild restrictions (legalized monopolies), all “in return for 
revenue” (1981, p.141). These exchanges signaled a shift in ideology consequent of a change in 
rhetoric, sweet talking.  
One of the first nations to achieve economic growth was the Netherlands, a nation under 
the rule of the financially strapped king of Spain. A country with limited natural resources, the 
Netherlands had an “initial comparative advantage in the manufacture of cloth [that led] to the 
development of an international market place where a wide range of goods was traded.” The 
leader of the Netherlands at the time, pressured by the empowered constituents, instated a 
representative body that could “vote taxes for the ruler” in 1493, and as a result, the “make-up of 
the assembly favored legislation that fostered the growth of trade and commerce and the granting 
and protection of private property rights that made growth possible” (North, 1981, p. 153). Due 
to the dependence on commerce, and the merchants that made the financial gains possible, the 
laws boosted trade, and the revenues brought in by the low tax on goods made the Netherlands 
the “crown jewel of the Hapsburg empire.” The population of the Netherlands depended on trade 
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for their livelihoods, and the laws that were enacted benefitted individuals, allowing them to 
keep their gains from trade and encouraged innovation.  
When the King of Spain, who acted as a remote stationary bandit over the Netherlands, 
exacted more financial demands on the nation, the provinces revolted, and “the republic that 
emerged retained the structure of law and property rights that had led to the commercial 
eminence of the Dutch in the first place” (North, 1981, p. 153). Other nations whose states had 
weak holds over their people, notably England, took notice of the United Provinces successes 
and followed suit. With the return of property rights, and states that upheld these rights without 
extorting them, individuals gained the incentives to invent new technologies, as well as innovate 
existing knowledge to be more efficient and effective.  
A reoccurring theme throughout North’s narrative is the role of ideology. States rely on 
the complacency of the people, whether that is through content civilians or scared ones, in order 
to continue extracting rents. If the civilians are not pleased and the legitimacy of the government 
is in question, there is always the threat of revolt. People under a common nation, religion, or 
language are bonded through their shared beliefs and common rhetoric, and a state’s enforcement 
of these traits can strengthen the state’s influence over its constituents.  
Deirdre McCloskey, an economic historian who specializes in rhetoric and philosophy 
among numerous other topics, argues that ideology plays a much larger role than just in the 
legitimization of governments. In Bourgeois Equality, McCloskey presents the concept of “sweet 
talk” as the driving force of the Industrial Revolution, and how sweet talk among common 
people led to the weakened state influence that North detailed. The population decrease due to 
the plague and the increase of state debts destabilized states, and this weakening of states enabled 
the push for the selling of property rights back to the constituents. Over many centuries in 
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western Europe, rhetoric evolved. Constituents became less dependent on government directives 
and orders, and instead learned to listen to each other as they bargained in the market. When 
individuals had the freedom to invent – and to collect gains from inventions that the state did not 
extract – they had the incentive to cooperate and work with others. They learned persuasion, or 
“sweet talk.” The gains from collaborations birthed the Industrial Revolution. Until this period 
commerce and power were controlled by rulers and by states, but the Industrial Revolution 
demonstrated a break from this equilibrium, as individuals of every class began to change their 
worlds. 
McCloskey (2016) asserts that this change can be seen in the Netherlands as early as the 
13th century. She quotes Herman Pleji, a student of Dutch literature, who states that “the virtues 
associated [in the sixteenth century] with capitalism and the Reformation were not new… [but] 
had already been setting the tone for more than two centuries” in the Dutch regions Brabant and 
Flanders. Pleji argues that urban literature, such as Heinric en Margriete van Limborch, “played 
an active role in forming, defending, and propagating what came to be called middle-class 
virtues, which revolved around practicality and utilitarianism” (McCloskey, 2016, p. 330). This 
work, which was originally written in the 13th century, was republished in 1516, “with such 
commercial amendments as having [the main knight find]… honor not merely in the knightly 
fighting and hunting and wooing,… but the honest paying of the merchant(s)” that he 
encountered (p. 330). These edits were evidence of the subversive beliefs that were growing 
among the populace.  
Chivalry, and the principles that it held to, helped to maintain the legitimacy of states, but 
as individuals found value in their own achievements, what was due honor evolved to include 
acts of individuals towards each other (McCloskey, 2016, p. 330). The change in rhetoric 
 13 
embodied the change in what was considered virtuous in society. Without the strong presence of 
the state or high aristocracy, Dutch society came to rely and value the economic contributions of 
the middle-class. McCloskey labels the “owners and managers in town, risk takers or word 
workers, big or small in their capital, disproportionately literate and numerate, earning a living 
by conversation and calculation” the Bourgeois, without the negative connation derived from 
Marx (2016, p. xvii). The influence of the bourgeois originated from the persuasion that they 
employed and from the inventions, innovations, and ideas that they brought to the market. 
Persuasion and coercion are very different. Webster’s Dictionary defines coercion as 
being “compel[led] by force or threat” (Webster's Dictionary of the American Language, 1976). 
Not all state actions resulted in force, but the danger of force being unleashed was enough threat 
for constituents to follow the directives of the elites, whether to pay more in taxes, to labor in the 
lord’s field that day, or to go to war for their king. McCloskey labels this the “Aristocratic Deal,” 
in which: 
You [the constituent] honor me, an aristocrat by natural inequality, and give me the 
liberty to extract rents from you in the first act, and in the second and all subsequent acts. 
I forbid you under penalty of death to seek competitive ‘protection.’ By the third act of 
the zero-sum drama, if you have behaved yourself, and have pulled your forelock or 
made your curtsey as I ride by, I will not at least have slaughtered you (McCloskey, 
2016, p.22). 
Most of humanity had lived under the Aristocratic Deal for thousands of years. Birth dictated 
one’s station and any deviation was peculiar and rare. The stations were preserved through the 
threat of force. The upper classes were due honor, and this equilibrium legitimized the existence 
of the state. The protection referred to in the passage was just as much from other states as it was 
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protection from the aristocracy of the peasant’s own state. McCloskey describes this relationship 
as “extortion, not protection,” as civilians acted out of fear of their own government’s retaliation 
(2016, p. 22). In this economy, ownership was temporary at best; for at any moment, elites could 
take it away. Most occupations were under some version of “coerc[ion] or supervis[ion]” (2016, 
p.495). 
 Persuasion is convincing someone else, without the threat of force or the duplicity of 
fraud. Persuasion is the backbone of the “Bourgeois Deal” in which: 
You accord to me, a bourgeois projector, the liberty and dignity to try out my schemes in 
voluntary trade, and let me keep the profits, if I get any, in my first act – though I accept, 
reluctantly, that others will compete with me in the second act. In exchange, in the third 
act of a new, positive-sum drama, the bourgeois-betterment provided by me (and by those 
pesky, low-quality, price-spoiling competitors) will make you all rich” (McCloskey, 
2016, p. 21). 
This Bourgeois Deal was between individuals who were not bound to act in certain ways because 
of their station in society or by the threat of government force. Instead, individuals could 
persuade each other with “sweet talk,” with the promise of future profits and/or gains – using 
inducement, not intimidation or lies, to “change minds” (2016, p. 490). The ability of individuals 
to do this depended on a state that would not suppress the means of negotiation or take away the 
incentives to trade, as well as other individuals who were willing to cooperate, and to respect the 
deals that were being made. McCloskey labels this switch in society as the “Bourgeois 
Reevaluation… [that] liberated and dignified ordinary people making betterments” (2016, p. 
506). In societies where “it was not a sin to be bourgeois,” such as the Netherlands in the 1600s, 
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individuals had the freedom to make trades that bettered themselves and their partners and were 
encouraged to do so (2016, p. 329).  
 Economic historian, Joel Mokyr, who specializes in the time period of 1750-1914, 
chronicles technological advancements throughout the history of the world in The Lever of 
Riches. Mokyr stresses that technological advancements were slow to be adopted and improved 
before the Industrial Revolution in the 1700s. Generations of farmers plowed, sowed, and reaped 
using the same technology that their parents and grandparents had toiled under. The slow 
adoption rate of new tools and methods meant that “old techniques often stubbornly survived and 
coexisted with the new for decades and even centuries” (Mokyr, 1990, p. 32). Individuals were 
more likely to work with what they knew rather than try to improve their tools or invest in new 
technologies.  
Inventions and innovations were stalled by the stratification of society and the lack of 
incentives that individuals faced. Inventions and innovations are not interchangeable synonyms, 
but instead “are complements” (Mokyr, 1990, p. 10). Mokyr argues that:  
Invention depends on factors that determine individual behavior, as the inventor is 
ultimately alone in his or her attempt to make something work. Innovation, on the other 
hand, requires interaction with other individuals, depends on institutions and markets, and 
is thus largely social and economic in nature. (1990, p.11) 
Inventions require the creation of new technologies with new knowledge, while innovations 
apply existing knowledge to make improvements in efficiency, cost, or production.  
For societies to be “technologically creative,” they must “be both inventive and 
innovative, as “without invention, innovation would eventually slow down and grind to a halt… 
[and] without innovation, inventors will lack focus and have little economic incentive to pursue 
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new ideas” (Mokyr, 1990, p.11). More than this, for new inventions to be used by the market, 
they would often have to be innovated to fit environmental needs as well as fit with each 
society’s needs. Innovations required the support of the market., which enabled exchange, where 
sweet talk could take place between inventors, innovators, engineers, financers, and consumers. 
Mokyr compares Islamic civilizations and Christian civilizations in the Middle Ages. He 
states that:  
the Moslems were enthusiastic collectors, but they offered little in the way of 
interpretation or theory; unlike the Christian West they were not driven, apparently, ‘by a 
strange urge to peer beneath the surface of things and see how they worked’ (Watson, 
1983, 94, 146)” (1990, p.40). 
The difference in the ideologies of the two societies, in the mindset in which Muslims and 
Christians viewed new technology and discussed it with each other, affected how much 
advancement could be derived from it. Islamic societies were good at applying the ideas 
borrowed from other civilizations, but seldom invented new technologies, and “Islamic society 
eventually ran out of steam” (Mokyr, 1990, p. 44). The society in which the new technology is 
presented matters more than what the technology itself is, as even the most revolutionary 
advancements will not take hold unless the people are persuaded to accept it (1990, p.138). 
 This means that governments cannot advance their countries’ productivity without the 
support of constituents who are eager to adapt to change and “accept the novelty” of new 
technologies. Ancient Greek and Roman governments invested large percentages of revenue into 
the construction of war machines. This promotion of technological advancement allowed for the 
recognition of the importance of essential elements of machines, such as “the lever, the wedge 
and the screw, as well as the elements of motion transmission, such as the ratchet, the pulley, the 
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gear, and the cam” (Mokyr, 1990, p.21). These important elements are the foundations of the 
technologies that we use today and demonstrated major breakthroughs. Except, these martial 
advancements didn’t advance society, but merely strengthened the capacity of elites to extract 
rents.  
Mokyr states that “these insights were applied mostly to war machines and clever gadgets 
that were admired for their own sake but rarely put to useful purposes” (1990, p. 22). The Greek 
state sponsored inventors such as Hero and Ctesibius of Alexandria. Hero engineered temple 
doors that opened by a steam engine and a coin-operated holy water vending machine. Ctesibius 
invented a force pump, a water clock, and metal springs. These inventions “served at best 
recreational purposes” and had “no direct economic purpose” nor did they impact the economy 
(1990, p.22). A civilian in Greece did not witness any of these inventions and adapt them for his 
own use to improve his productivity. While the inventors were incentivized through state 
funding, civilians had no incentive to apply them to production. 
 The Roman state’s “political leaders acquired popularity and political power by carrying 
out successful public works” (Mokyr, 1990, p. 20). Rome’s infrastructure, highly subsidized by 
the government, included paved streets, sewage systems, and water supplies via aqueducts that 
supported public bathhouses. Investments in public works purchased legitimacy and gave the 
Roman Empire vast amounts of credit throughout history.  
However, Mokyr argues that this hype is undue. The systems were “highly developed,” 
but they were more impressive due to their scale and scope, rather than evidence of a creative 
society. Without active market engagement, the most efficient methods of enacting these works 
were neglected, as the state’s goal was to bring the projects to fruition so that the constituents 
would be satiated, not that expenses were minimized or that the projects closely met the needs of 
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consumers. Moykr gives Rome credit for the invention of concrete masonry, but other public 
works projects were just expansions of Hellenistic inventions (1990, p. 20). Even the religion of 
Rome, the dominant rhetoric, was copied from the Greeks, as it was an effective tool for 
legitimization of the government. 
Furthermore, the praise of Roman roads, Mokyr claims, “should not be exaggerated” as 
the roads’ economic and cultural significance has been much overstated by historians and the 
media. These roads were constructed for “military purposes and their use by the general public 
for the purpose of trade was incidental.” The only roads that lasted past the Roman Empire’s 
demise were those that were used infrequently (1990, p. 21). Archeologist M.C. Bishop argues 
that “the Roman roads of Hollywood films with neatly paved surfaces are a standard visual 
cliché… such roads were not common in the provinces” due to the available materials or labor 
hours required (Bishop, 2014). The Roman roads in Britain lacked long-term durability, which 
would have been vital if the intended purpose of the road construction was to encourage trade. 
Bishop states that the roads constructed in Britain were for “military construction and 
exploitation” and that expansions on the military roads were completed and funded by British 
town councils who taxed their constituents, not Rome or its citizens (Bishop, 2014). 
The Roman government sponsored many public works projects, but these offerings did 
not promote a society that valued invention and innovation. If anything, the handouts stifled 
private incentives. North states that Rome “was feeding 120,000 of its citizens free” off of the 
ever-increasing taxes that were burdened by the lowest classes in Roman society, those that “had 
little access to political favoritism” (North, 1981, p. 122).  
Roman constituents lacked incentives to innovate, and there was little advancement in 
inventions, as:  
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when classical civilization succeeded in creating a novel technique it was often unable or 
unwilling to take it to its logical conclusion and to extract anything approximating the 
maximum economic benefit from it. Many inventions that could have led to major 
economic changes were undeveloped, forgotten, or lost” (Mokyr, 1990, p. 29). 
 State investments in infrastructure and technology were not intended to lead to economic 
progress, and technological advancements did not occur as an external result.  
While states can encourage economic growth, they cannot create it from nothing. 
Economist Friedrich Hayek (1945) attributes this deficiency to the knowledge problem, wherein: 
  “knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and 
frequently contradictory knowledge which all separate individuals possesses” and that a 
“single mind” could “never be so given” (Hayek, 1945, p. 519).  
Hayek explains that knowledge about factors in the economy is dispersed throughout the 
population, and those that specialize in a trade or position are able to gather information that is 
relevant to them and use the information when “the circumstances of the fleeting moment” deem 
it necessary (1945, p. 522). In a decentralized economy, individuals make decisions based on 
prices. Hayek refers to this price system as a “marvel... not the product of human design” that 
people do not realize that they follow. Price makes up for lack of information as it “coordinate[s] 
the separate actions of different people” (1945, p. 526, 527).  
Centralized governments have difficulty making efficient decisions as the state is not an 
expert in every market or field. The state is also not subject to prices as the state can use force to 
coerce the exchange of goods, and without prices, an active market is incapable of efficient 
economic calculation. To attempt to make efficient decisions, the knowledge would have to be 
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gathered from the public and “given to [a] planner” (Hayek, 1945, p. 520). If the Roman 
government were to build efficient roads for the purpose of developing trade and growing the 
economy, the state would need to ascertain the best materials for the terrain, the best route for the 
roads, the most efficient way to lay the roads, etc. But to know the best option is to have good 
information about the opportunity costs of alternatives, and calculation of costs requires prices. 
All of this information would need to be communicated to the panel in charge. 
The Roman government did not, however, build the roads for the advancement of the 
economy or to stimulate markets with trade, but to enforce the state’s legitimacy through the 
power of the Roman army, which was enabled to move quicker with the placement of 
dependable roads. The public works projects were tools to maintain legitimacy as well, as a 
placated public would be less likely to rebel from the Roman state’s influence. The state knew 
when to fund a new project or subsidize more perks for citizens when the respect of the 
government was being questioned. Where decentralized markets can depend on the price system 
to make efficient choices, centralized governments are much slower to respond. The difference 
between the inventions of ancient Rome and those of eighteenth-century Western Europe was 
who was doing the inventing and the drives that motivated them.  
While Hero and Ctesibius were incentivized to invent and tinker, many individuals did 
not have this privilege. Mokyr states that, in classical antiquity, “the number of engineers and 
inventors was small and they often tried to keep their inventions secret, taking their ideas with 
them to the grave” (Mokyr, 1990, p. 29). Society was not open to the idea of inventors, and any 
inventions that could be conceptualized would have been unwelcome to the market.  
During the Renaissance, this continued to be the case, as “the handicaps and obstacles 
that new technology faced during this period” were brought about by the “extent [to which] 
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society tolerates deviation and nonconformism” (Mokyr, 1990, p.75-76). Religious movements 
in Christianity, including the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, created a negative 
environment for inventors who were going against the grain of their communities.  Mokyr states 
that the church-state in Europe became “a more bigoted place than it had been since the 
Crusades” and that “the authorities’ patience for people who thought for themselves and were 
critical of dogma was wearing thin” (1990, p. 76).  
Not only were religious institutions set against change, states themselves often 
discouraged technological innovations in order to appease guilds, which were made up of 
powerful “manufacturers as well as merchants” (North, 1981, p. 133). Mokyr reasons that “there 
are many documented cases of the authorities trying to suppress innovations in established 
industries, doubtlessly instigated by lobbies of vested interests” and monopolies that were held 
by the guilds (Mokyr, 1990, p. 77). Unfortunately for guilds and religious institutions that 
survived on placated constituents and protection from states, constituents in Western Europe 
were beginning to place their faith in different foundations.  
A change in communal beliefs allowed for the acceptance and encouragement of 
advancing technologies. Mokyr states that “the very essence of technological change is such that 
some mental change had to occur first” (1990, p. 202). Boiling all cultures and civilizations into 
just one explanation for the aversion to technological change before the Industrial Revolution 
would be impossible and inaccurate, as the ideologies of each culture were shaped by many 
different factors. Mokyr illustrates two main concepts for the slow accruement of technological 
advancements: the mindset in which individuals viewed their place in society and their place in 
nature. The strength of these forces varied in each individual civilization. 
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Classes in society develop through exertion of power, and peculiarities in rhetoric. The 
grouping of individuals due to labor types, incomes, and lineages can be seen in most societies, 
though in some civilizations the lines are blurred and easier to cross. In the pre-Industrial 
Revolution world (and since this period, as the effects of class structures are still prevalent in 
today’s societies), however, these distinctions often came with negative connotations towards 
labor and those that performed it, further separating classes from each other. Mokyr claims that 
the class structure limited individuals not only in their actions, but also in how they thought, 
asserting that “an ascriptive hierarchy in which economic and social status were inherited rather 
than achieved would naturally inhibit technical progress” (1990, p. 196).  
For Mokyr, this argument is based on the concept that those who were performing labor, 
such as working the fields or creating textiles, would be the ones who knew the mechanics of the 
labor that they were performing. Individuals with the technical and local knowledge necessary to 
invent improved methods for production had neither the class prestige to press for these 
improvements nor the education to expand upon their concepts, and might not have had the 
incentive to do so anyway, if their gains could be easily taxed away. Even those who were 
educated in math and engineering weren’t often incentivized to make real change.  
Mokyr contends that the Roman influence on western Europe, even after the fall of the 
empire, prioritized “distinctly noneconomic achievements: military, intellectual, administrative, 
and artistic knowledge were appreciated more than production” (1990, p.199). The expansion of 
technical knowledge was driven by academics, who did not utilize what they learned to develop 
new technologies or increase productivity or promote efficiency. Mokyr describes this as a 
“chasm between the educated and literate classes on the one hand, and the working portions of 
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the population on the other,” and this divide, increased by differences in rhetoric, separated skill 
from technical knowledge.  
The other factor that contended with technological advancement was the position that 
man saw himself filling in nature. Religions played a large role in this. If nature was considered 
to be above man; “if every stream, every tree, every patch of land is populated by spirits, the 
environment remains capricious, unpredictable, and uncontrollable” and “tinkering with 
[nature’s] rules was dangerous and sinful” (Mokyr, 1990, p. 200). This discouragement was 
powerful enough among uneducated classes. The rise of Christianity altered man’s role in nature 
from a powerless pawn at the whim of nature and gods to the natural caretaker of the world 
through the rhetoric displayed in the Bible, and this subverted the power structure. Mokyr writes 
that: 
 “if nature is perceived as a hostile and jealous adversary, or if the payoff that really 
matters is the salvation of the soul, then there seems little point in playing the game at all. 
But if the universe is subject to logical, mechanical forces that can be controlled and 
manipulated in ways that do not involve committing a sin, and if it becomes clear that the 
payoff is a standard of living above the very minimum of subsistence, the first condition 
necessary for the beginning of technological progress is fulfilled.” (1990, p. 202) 
If man is no longer too weak to control nature, if man is understood as participating with God in 
an ongoing creative work, the limitations of society are weak as well.  
This shift in beliefs did not happen all at once, but very slowly, over hundreds of years. 
The strength of guilds and states weakened over time, as did the effectiveness of investments in 
legitimacy made by states. McCloskey portrays the situation in this way: 
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“In northwestern Europe the strange idea rose up that aristocracy (the rule of the best by 
descent) and theocracy (the rule of priests) and even plutocracy (the rule of the present 
rich) were all nasty. What replaced them in people’s ideology, slowly, was the rule of the 
better technique, allowing free entry to compete with the monopolies that the aristocrats 
or the plutocrats had arranged under the aegis of a captured government. The new 
ideology in places like Britain and Belgium around 1800 favored a “betterocracy,” 
…[where] the profits [should go] to the betterers” (McCloskey, 2016, p. 22). 
The “betterers” in this excerpt are the bourgeois inventors and business-owners, whose “better 
techniques” allowed them to make profits from entering markets that earlier inventors had been 
dissuaded from entering by to guilds and elite institutions. The advantages of the bourgeois were 
due to a supportive society as well as the marketing techniques that the inventors used, including 
knowledge of their target market, the creation of products that fit consumer needs, and the 
rhetoric that was utilized. 
 The field of marketing is relatively new, only becoming a distinct discipline in the early 
1900s. Notre Dame marketing professors, William L. Wilkie and Elizabeth S. Moore (2003), 
detail the history of marketing as a discipline in “Scholarly Research in Marketing: Exploring the 
‘4 Eras of Thought Development.’” Wilkie and Moore state that the period they label as “Pre-
Marketing” encapsulates “marketing related phenomena [that] was available prior to the formal 
beginnings of the field of study” (Wilkie & Moore, 2003, p. 116). This information was recorded 
and detailed by: 
the great economists of the 1700s and 1800s (including Smith, Malthus, Jevons, Ricardo, 
Mill, and Marshall) [who studied] the concepts of markets, marginal analysis, value, 
production, humans as social and economic entities, competition, and the role of 
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governments… at of the turn of the twentieth century, therefore, the area that would 
become “marketing” was firmly ensconced within the field of economics (Wilkie & 
Moore, 2003, p. 116).  
Marketing spawned off of the field of economics as economists became free to express their 
ideas in a society under the waning influence of state and religion.  
Mokyr states that in Britain, the “government was one of, by, and for property owners” 
(Mokyr, 1990, p. 246). Further, “inventions and improvements became, in some circles at least, 
respectable” after inventors began to accumulate wealth and fame (1990, p. 255). States in the 
West became formatted to support and encourage inventors as inventions helped make society 
better off and the constituents, who benefited from the new products diffusing through the 
market, promoted the occurrence of this change. 
 This had not always been the case with inventions. As stated earlier, the slow diffusion 
rate of new products was very common before the Industrial Revolution. Products that did not 
enter the consumer market did not have the opportunity to affect the economy. One of the 
greatest examples of this is the clock. In the first millennium, China invented its first water 
clock. Su Sung, a Chinese scientist and statesman, created a clock that was “40 ft. high, and 
display[ed] not only the time but also an impressive array of astronomical variables” (Mokyr, 
1990, p. 214-215). This clock, however, was not commercialized so that it could be replicated 
and sold to citizens. Instead, Su Sung’s hydraulic clock was “built by and for government 
officials at the emperor’s instructions,” and even the time that the clock displayed was under the 
sovereignty of the emperor, who “monopolze[d] the measurement of time and the calendar” 
(Mokyr, 1990, p. 233). Like with the Greek inventors Hero and Ctesibius, Su Sung invented for 
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the state, not for himself, and any economic benefit that arose from his work was filtered through 
the motives of his government, and captured as rents by the elite. 
 In contrast, the weight-driven mechanical clock, invented in the 13th century Europe, had 
an enormous effect on the economy and on society. Europeans and Arabs had “been able to build 
sophisticated water clocks,” but Mokyr explains that water clocks were unreliable, as water is 
liable to freeze and evaporate (1990, p. 49). The invention of the weight-driven mechanical clock 
spurred competition as well as diffusion through the European market. Mokyr delineates that: 
by the middle of the fourteenth century clockmakers such as the Dondi family and 
Richard of Wallingford were making complex devices that indicated not just the time, but 
also every astronomical motion then known. Clocks spread rapidly throughout Europe. 
Landes (1983, p. 57) points to a “clear sense of excitement and pride” in the new 
mechanisms. Every town felt that it had to possess this marvel…. In the middle of the 
fifteenth century spring-driven clocks and watches appeared… and watches became a 
popular consumer good among the better-off” (Mokyr, 1990, p. 49-50).  
In the European market, clocks were valued by individuals as well as states, and this interest 
incentivized clock-makers to discover ways to make clocks more accessible to their markets. In 
the beginning of this diffusion process, entire towns were needed to raise the funds for a shared 
clock, but in the turn of one century, individuals were able to purchase clocks small enough to be 
held in a hand, and durable enough to be a part of a person’s daily wardrobe, pocket-watches.  
The mechanical clock demonstrated the value in a respectable consumer market, and as 
French clock-makers fled to Britain after “‘a wave of anti-Protestant bigotry’ (Landes, 1983, p. 
219),” Britain built its mechanical industry on the “mechanical skills of clock-makers” which 
acted as a “cornerstone” (Mokyr, 1990, p. 241). The commercial success of clocks pushed for 
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further developments in the mechanical field as other inventors hoped to find gains. However, if 
inventors did not know the needs and wants of their consumers, any efforts towards discovering 
a new product would be a blind pursuit founded on luck. 
 Bourgeois inventors’ and innovators’ abilities to impact markets was attributable to the 
knowledge that they were able to gather and utilize. This relates back to Hayek’s distribution of 
knowledge theory. Economist Israel Kirzner (1997) argues that knowledge can be enhanced 
through market interaction, and that markets reach:  
equilibrium [through] a systematic process in which market participants acquire more and 
more accurate and complete mutual knowledge of potential demand and supply 
attitudes… [through] entrepreneurial discovery (Kirzner, 1997, p. 62).  
As more products reach the market, consumers are able to make more choices based on their 
needs and preferences. This results in more information being available to entrepreneurs to 
capitalize on. Economist and professor Steven Horwitz states that:  
in the market, experience, context, and skill can lead individuals to know things about 
their environment and about how to react to it—knowledge that cannot be communicated 
except through the choices they make in the marketplace (Horwitz, 2009, p. 518-519).  
The marketplace is both the display of current knowledge and the tool with which more 
knowledge can be gathered.  
The driving force of competition also incentivizes entrepreneurs to try and meet 
consumer needs as closely as possible in order to maintain or grow their market share and to 
continue to gain profits. Kirzner states that competition “manifests itself in the facts that the 
sellers must outdo one another by offering better or cheaper goods and services” (1997, p. 68). 
Innovations and inventions give entrepreneurs an edge over their competition or open up 
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completely new markets, allowing for the reach of more consumers and more profits. Good 
marketing requires knowledge being used opportunely.  
 During the Industrial Revolution in Britain, this drive to combine skill with market 
knowledge resulted in “British scientists and engineers work[ing] together with commercially 
minded persons, who were more interested in money than in matters political or military” 
(Mokyr, 1990, p. 242). The Roman ideals that separated science from skill were weakened as the 
incentives for profit were introduced. McCloskey states that “on the supply side, the creativity of 
ordinary people now able to become extraordinary was released” as the lower and middle classes 
were no longer stuck within their castes and had the opportunity to bring forth ideas and gain 
rewards. This not only benefitted inventors and innovators or those who were business-savvy, 
but also benefited consumers, as “on the demand side, the tastes of ordinary people were 
indulged in cheap watches and Model T Fords and no-press shirts” (McCloskey, 2016, p. 40). 
The open dialogue between consumers and producers allowed for a wave of consumerism, where 
consumers were catered to, and those who catered the best were rewarded. The father of 
economics, Adam Smith (1904), argued that “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” 
(Smith, 1904). The entrepreneurial, innovative, inventive bourgeois were individuals who, by 
acting in their own interests, produced betterments as a result. 
 This view has the potential to be contentious because people acting in their own interests 
have the power to overlook and trample on the interests of others. In the time periods before the 
Industrial Revolution this was often the case, where stationary bandits and elites took advantage 
of others, deemed them the lower class, and kept them there to toil on behalf of their betters. 
During the Industrial Revolution, the low wages in factories, the rising rates of pollution, and the 
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dismal living conditions in cities stand out as negatives in a time when economic progress was 
taking great strides. In the short run, these actions may lead to financial profits for the unethical 
businesses perpetrating them.  
In the long run, however, ethical policies and actions act to boost the legitimacy of 
businesses and brands, acquiring the favor of consumers, just as public works projects have 
boosted the legitimacy of governments. McCloskey argues that: 
Trade-betterment since 1800 came in part, of course, from prudence and profit, which 
would indeed, without other virtues in attendance, constitute… ‘greed’…. But the 
betterment came also from other virtues – hope, justice, courage, love, faith, and 
temperance – and raised the prestige of commercial versions of these too. [Modern day] 
corporations such as Merck, UPS, Walt Disney, and Lockheed-Martin had by early 2014, 
out of a sense of commercial justice and not merely out of instrumental calculation, 
stopped giving money to the then-homophobic Boy Scouts of America (McCloskey, 
2016, p. xxi). 
In the same vein, Horwitz detailed Walmart’s swift efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 
as the superstore provided “a large amount of free merchandise, including prescription drugs, to 
those in the worst-hit areas… almost immediately after the storm had passed” (2009, p. 514). 
Walmart was motivated to do this, in part, for the “long-term payoff” in reputation. By becoming 
a trusted brand, stores like Walmart can gain customers’ loyalty. Home Depot, which also 
donated supplies and labor after the 2005 hurricane, expounded on this, with an executive stating 
that “I can’t think of a quicker way to lose customers than price-gouging” (2009, p. 522). While 
these are modern examples, they demonstrate ethical decisions that payoff in the long run for 
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businesses, rather than short-term. The purchasing of legitimacy and reputation, when done 
ethically, can bring both companies profit as well as benefits for consumers. 
 The world before the Industrial Revolution saw little change. Under states, powerful 
religious institutions, and guilds, the incentives for an individual to better his life were dampened 
by restrictions, both socially and politically. Only during the Dark Ages did this begin to alter, as 
the institutions that controlled beliefs lost their hold. Inventions and innovations came to the 
marketplace, and both the suppliers and the consumers of these goods and services benefited 
from this exchange. When the bourgeois tailored their offerings towards their consumers, and 
competed against rivals for efficiency and productivity increases, the outcome was the Industrial 
Revolution. Although Bob Dylan wasn’t writing about this time period in his 1964 song, the 
lyrics “your sons and your daughters/are beyond your command/your old road is rapidly agin’” 
can be applied to the social shift in beliefs that permitted the Industrial Revolution to take place 
(Dylan, 1964). Within the span of a few generations, life was irrevocably different, and the 
betterment that society has garnered as a result can be witnessed in the lives of individuals who 
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